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Truth Without People? 
HANS-JOHANN GLOCK 
I. Realism, Anthropocentrism and the Concept of Truth 
There is a venerable tradition according to which the concept of 
truth is totally independent of human beings, their actions and 
beliefs, because truth consists in the correspondence of mind-inde- 
pendent propositions to a mind-independent reality. For want of a 
better general term, I shall refer to this position as realism. There 
is an equally venerable, if less venerated, anti-realist tradition 
which questions the mind-independent nature of truth in some 
respect. One way of doing so is relativism, the idea that whether a 
belief is true or false depends on the point of view of individuals or 
communities. A closely related position is a consensus theory of 
truth, according to which a belief is true if it is held by a (suitably 
qualified) group of people. In a similar vein, the pragmatist theory 
maintains that a true belief is one which it is expedient for us to 
accept. 
The realists would not deny that the truth or falsity of some of 
our beliefs is at least partly determined by what people say and do. 
This holds for those beliefs which are about human activities or 
their results. It is true that realists have often tended to play down 
the fact that most of our beliefs, including those of scientists in 
their laboratories, are not about the 'starry heavens above', but 
about human actions, or about objects and events which have been 
created or shaped by human activities. But this blindspot does not 
affect the cogency of their objections to the anti-realist positions. 
Relativism is wrong because to say that a belief is 'true for' a cer- 
tain individual or community can amount to no more than saying 
that it is accepted by that individual or community. Both the con- 
sensus and the pragmatist theory ignore the fact that the truth- 
value of our beliefs depends on how things are, not on how we say 
or think that they are, or on what we find expedient to believe. 
Such points, suitably elaborated, rule out the above forms of 
anti-realism. But there are other ways of denying that truth is 
independent of human beings in absolutely every respect. One 
such approach is semantic anti-realism, which holds that proposi- 
tions cannot be regarded as true or false unless it is possible in 
principle to verify or falsify them. This essay is concerned with yet 
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another challenge to the realist conception, one which has been 
less widely discussed, but is equally important. I shall refer to it as 
anthropocentrism, since it makes the notion of truth dependent on 
human activity (the point would apply equally to nonhuman intel- 
ligent creatures). One source of this position is pragmatism. Thus 
Davidson ascribes to Dewey the view that 
nothing in the world, no object or event, would be true or false, 
if there were not thinking creatures. 
Davidson defends this claim on the grounds that without creatures 
using sentences, nothing would count as a sentence, and hence the 
concept of truth would 'have no application'.' A similar idea is to 
be found in Wittgenstein. 
'So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true 
and what is false?' It is what human beings say that is true and 
false; and they agree in the language they use (Philosophical 
Investigations, §241). 
In an unpublished manuscript (MS 124, pp. 212-3) he elaborated 
So are you saying that human agreement determines //decides// 
what is true //correct// or false //incorrect? Correct or incorrect 
exist only in thinking, and hence in the expression of thoughts. 
Realists like Russell have attacked Dewey's account of truth as 
being idealist, and Davidson has been charged with the same mis- 
demeanour. Similarly, Wittgenstein has been accused of reducing 
truth to the consensus of a community. However, both Davidson 
and Wittgenstein explicitly disown the disreputable views ascribed 
to them. Prima facie, at least, they are right. Their claim is not that 
without people there would be no mountains, or that it is human 
consensus which decides whether it is true that there are moun- 
tains. Rather, they maintain that the notion of truth depends on, 
or in some way alludes to, the mental and linguistic activities of 
people. 
In fact, one can distinguish two different claims in their posi- 
tion. One is that the existence of the concept of truth depends on the 
activities of 'thinking creatures' or people; the other that the con- 
cept of truth can only be explained by reference to such activities. 
The first idea is that, unlike mountains, concepts are artefacts. 
It implies 
(1) If there were no people, there would be no concept of truth. 
'The Structure and Content of Truth', Journal of Philosophy 87 
(1990), pp. 279, 300. 
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A possible rationale for (1) is conceptualism, the idea that a con- 
cept is a principle of classification which exists only as part of our 
activity of classification. If people did not classify things, e.g., into 
those which are radioactive and those which are not, the concept of 
radioactivity would not exist. By the same token, if there were no 
human beings, and if consequently no classifications were made at 
all, there would be no concepts whatsoever. 
This claim is compatible with the fact that people use different 
words for drawing the distinction between being radioactive and 
not being radioactive. It is also compatible with the idea that prop- 
erties, unlike concepts, exist independently of human beings: ura- 
nium has the property of being radioactive whether or not any- 
body so classifies it. Conceptualism is even compatible with the 
idea (denied by conceptual relativists) that our concepts must mir- 
ror such mind-independent properties. For that idea implies only 
that concepts which fail to mirror the purported properties of the 
world are incorrect, not that any concepts (correct or incorrect) 
exist without creatures classifying things. 
Different versions of conceptualism disagree on whether the 
human activity to which concepts owe their existence is mental 
(acts of abstraction, or of the imagination) or linguistic (the rule- 
guided use of words). But in either version, conceptualism is con- 
troversial. One might protest that even if there were no creatures 
making classifications, there would be principles of classification 
according to which things could be classified if there were such 
creatures. However, the idea that concepts exist independently of 
people explaining justifying or correcting their classifications by 
reference to such principles presupposes that concepts are self- 
subsistent entities. Since they are not material objects, they would 
have to be abstract entities that reside in a separate ontological 
realm beyond space and time. 
To hold this view is to adopt a Platonist account of concepts. 
Accordingly, there is at least one qualification of the realist con- 
ception of truth which is not committed to anti-realist positions. 
To deny that concepts exist independently of human practice is 
not to condone relativism, idealism, or a pragmatist or consensus 
theory. Rather, it is to reject the Platonist claim that a general term 
like 'truth' refers to a self-subsistent abstract entity. Thus 
Wittgenstein would argue that this term expresses a concept not 
because it stands for something beyond space and time, but 
because there is a rule-guided practice of using it and its cognates, 
notably a practice of classifying statements into true and false. To 
use his famous analogy: what gives significance to the king in 
chess, and distinguishes it from a mere piece of wood, is not that it 
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is associated with an abstract entity, but that we have laid down 
rules for its use. 
While this position may not be unassailable, it is far from 
absurd. Note, however, that it covers all concepts. If correct, it 
holds for the concept of a mountain no less than for the concepts 
of truth and of falsity. While 
(2) If there were no people, there would be no mountains 
is false, on the conceptualist view 
(2') If there were no people, there would be no concept of a 
mountain 
is correct. The question is whether there is anything about the 
concepts of truth and falsity which separates them from concepts 
like that of a mountain by introducing an additional dependency 
on human beings and their activities. 
The second strand in anthropocentrism answers this question in the 
affirmative, on the grounds that the bearers of truth depend on peo- 
ple. In the next section, I reject the mentalist and nominalist con- 
ceptions of truth-bearers which would directly support that con- 
tention. We apply 'true' neither to mental episodes nor to sentences, 
but to what is or could be said. However, section III also rejects the 
Platonist view that truths are self-subsistent abstract entities. In the 
final section I argue that the result is not that there can be no truths 
without people (a thesis held by Rorty), but a more subtle anthro- 
pocentrism which links the concept of truth to the concept of a lan- 
guage. My ambition is not to provide conclusive arguments in 
favour of anthropocentrism. It is to show that there is a version of it 
which does not rest on implausible anti-realisms, but on subtle 
points in philosophical logic which deserve serious consideration. 
II. Unbearable Truth-Bearers: Mentalism and Nominalism 
It is uncontroversial that some concepts fit the anthropocentric 
view, namely those which classify exclusively human traits, or 
human activities and their results, e.g. the concept of bad manners. 
The general idea informing both Davidson and Wittgenstein is 
that it also holds of truth and falsity. A first stab at their position 
runs as follows 
(1') If there were no people, there would be no bearers of truth. 
This raises the vexed question of what the bearers of truth and 
falsehood are, or, to put it in the formal mode, of what the terms 
'true' and 'false' apply to. One traditional answer is mentalism. It 
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attributes truth to ideas, beliefs, thoughts or judgements, and con- 
ceives of these as mental phenomena (states or episodes) which are 
the inalienable property of individuals. Another answer is 
Platonism, which treats a truth as an abstract rather than as a men- 
tal entity, a thought (Frege) or proposition (Moore) which exists in 
a realm beyond space and time, independently of whether human 
beings understand, believe or propound it. 
The Platonist position implies realism, since it views truths as 
self-subsistent abstract entities. By contrast, mentalism entails the 
anthropocentric view: without intelligent creatures, there would 
not be the appropriate kind of mental episode (judgment, etc.) for 
'true' to apply to. However, it seems that the mentalist position 
can easily be disposed of through objections that have been 
advanced by Platonists like Bolzano and Frege. Truths cannot be 
private phenomena in the minds of individuals, since truths can be 
communicated, and since one and the same truth can be believed 
or rejected by different individuals. It is fortunate for anthro- 
pocentrism, therefore, that there is another option, nominalism, 
which holds that what is true or false are neither mental nor 
abstract objects, but material ones, namely sentences. 
Nominalism does not face the problems of mentalism, since its 
preferred truth-bearers are intersubjectively accessible. Often a 
nominalist account is simply stipulated as being the 'most conve- 
nient' one, or on the grounds that 'no confusion results' from 
adopting it.2 Such a stipulation may indeed be convenient for the 
purposes of its proponents, notably the construction of a formal 
semantics. But this cuts no ice in the present context. If the realist 
claims that the bearers of truth and falsity are language-indepen- 
dent, he cannot be refuted by pointing out that for constructive 
purposes in formal semantics it is convenient to apply 'is true' to 
sentences. After all, the debate between realism and anthropocen- 
trism concerns the notion of truth as employed in ordinary, non- 
philosophical discourse. 
Tarski, the pioneer of the view that sentences are truth-bearers, 
was alive to this point. He claimed that his definition of truth did 
'not aim to specify the meaning of a familiar word used to denote a 
novel notion', but 'to catch hold of the actual meaning of the old 
notion'. But in that case the correct procedure is not to decide 
what the bearers of truth are by stipulation, but to examine 
2 See e.g., M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: 
Duckworth, 1973), p. 444; A. Tarski, 'The Semantic Conception of 
Truth and the Foundations of Semantics', in H. Feigl and W. Sellars 
(eds), Readings in Philosophical Analysis (New York: Apple Century 
Crofts, 1949), p. 53 & fn5; D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 43-45. 
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whether in ordinary discourse 'is true' is used as a predicate of 
sentences. I shall argue that it is not. 
The claim that sentences are truth-bearers is ambiguous. It can 
mean either that a truth is a token-sentence, a particular utterance 
(sound) or inscription (marks on paper), or that it is a type-sen- 
tence, an acoustic or typographic pattern which can be instantiated 
by indefinitely many tokens. This second position was the one in 
effect held by Tarski.3 Since types are universals rather than par- 
ticulars, this position is not strictly speaking nominalist. But that 
does not matter for us, since on either view, the anthropocentric 
claim (1') holds true. Without speakers, there would be no token- 
sentences, and hence nothing for 'true' or 'false' to apply to. (1') 
equally holds if the bearers of truth and falsity are type-sentences. 
Without speakers, there would be no languages; and without lan- 
guages, there would be no type-sentences.4 
The idea that the bearers of truth and falsity are type-sentences 
runs into a difficulty pointed out by Strawson.5 Tokens of one and 
the same type can be used to express either a truth or a falsehood, 
depending on who uses it, where and when. This is not just the 
case with sentences involving indexicals ('You owe me ten dollars') 
but also with those involving most kinds of proper names ('The 
High Street is always busy'). 3 I ignore the complication that Tarski regarded sentences as 'classes of 
inscriptions of a similar form'. A type-sentence is not the same as the 
class of its tokens, since (i) the existence of tokens of that type is not 
guaranteed, (ii) there are properties of the tokens which the type must 
also possess, while the class cannot possess them: just like particular 
Union-Jacks, the Union-Jack type must be striped, which cannot be said 
of the class of Union Jacks. 
4 Ironically, in 'The Second Person', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
XVII (1992), pp. 255-6, Davidson seems to suggest that the existence of 
a language does not depend on anybody speaking it, because it is an 
abstract object, unobservable and changeless. It is difficult to see how 
this can be squared with his claim in 'The Structure and Content of 
Truth' that the concept of truth would have no application in the absence 
of speakers, since nothing would count as a sentence. If languages do not 
depend on speakers, how could sentences? In my view, the Platonism of 
Davidson's Tarskian heritage and the anthropocentrism of his pragmatist 
inclinations are pulling him into opposite directions here. But what 
counts for our purposes is this. To maintain that languages can exist 
without speakers is even more problematic than holding that concepts 
do. It implies, for example, that languages cannot die out, and that, as 
regards existence, there is no difference between Spanish and Mohican. 
' Logico-Linguistic Papers (London: Methuen, 1971), ch. 1; also S. 
Wolfram, Philosophical Logic: an Introduction (London: Routledge, 
1989), ch. 2.4. 
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In response to such difficulties, Quine and Davidson have mod- 
ified Tarski's position. In effect, they claim that it is token-sen- 
tences or utterances which are true or false. 'What are best seen as 
primarily true or false are not [type-]sentences but events of utter- 
ance'.6 But this hard-headed nominalism also runs into a problem. 
There seems to be a logical difference between truths and token- 
sentences. That is, it makes sense to say things about token-sen- 
tences which it does not make sense to say about truths. 
Token-sentences are particulars, acoustic events in the case of 
speech, visible material objects in the case of writing. They are 
located in space and time, and they have causes and effects. By 
contrast, truths or falsehoods are non-physical, atemporal and 
non-spatial. A spoken token-sentence can last for five seconds, be 
loud or high-pitched, but a truth cannot. A written token-sentence 
can be 10 cm long, consist of ink or chalk, and one can turn it 
upside down. But a truth cannot occupy any space or consist of 
any material stuff. One cannot destroy a truth by wiping a black- 
board, or by setting fire to a piece of paper, and one cannot turn it 
upside down, except metaphorically. 
However, there is a final option for the champions of sentences. 
To avoid absurdity, it may be conceded that the bearers of truth 
and falsity are types rather than tokens, that is, abstract entities 
which are proof against destruction by negligence or arson. To 
avoid the problem with Tarski's original suggestion, one can opt 
for type-sentences with a fixed rather than variable truth-value. 
Thus, in addition to suggesting that the bearers of truth are token- 
sentences, Quine also suggests that this role can be occupied by 
'eternal sentences'. Eternal sentences are type-sentences-'repeat- 
able linguistic forms' or 'sound patterns'-from which all indexi- 
cal elements (pronouns, tenses, etc.), as well as all ambiguity and 
vagueness, have been removed, for example 'Bernard Ortcutt owes 
W. V. Quine ten U.S. dollars on July 15 1968'.7 
6 W. V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1970), p. 13; see Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge/Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2. edn. 1992), pp. 78-9; see also D. Davidson, 
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984), pp. 33-4, 43-5, 58, 118. Davidson does not strictly speaking 
ascribe truths to speech acts, but his suggestion of relativizing the truth 
of a sentence to speakers, and times amounts to the same thing, since he 
treats speech acts as equivalent to ordered triples of sentences, speakers 
and times. To hold that a sentence is true 'as (potentially) spoken' by a 
person at a time is tantamount to saying that it is the utterance of the sen- 
tence by a person at a time which is true. 
7 Word and Object (Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), p. 191; 
Pursuit of Truth, p. 79. 
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Unfortunately, this suggestion also runs into difficulties. One 
problem is that the criteria of identity for truths, i.e. true beliefs, 
judgments, statements, claims, propositions, etc., are not the same 
as those for sentences even of the eternal variety. One and the same 
truth can be expressed not just by different token-sentences (e.g., 
different utterances of 'Snow is white'), but also by different type- 
sentences, such as 'Snow is white' and 'Schnee ist weil3'. 
Moreover, even type-sentences are logically distinct from truths 
and falsehoods.8 It makes sense to say things about the latter which 
it does not make sense to say about the former, and vice versa. 
What is true, that is, what is said, stated, asserted or claimed, can 
be in French, but unlike a type-sentence, it cannot be French. A 
type-sentence can contain six words or two commas, it can be ele- 
gant or clumsy, ungrammatical, hard to pronounce or badly punc- 
tuated, but none of this can be said of a truth. What is true, e.g. 
that the universe is unlimited yet finite, can be astonishing or 
remarkable. But sentences are remarkable in a completely different 
way, e.g. by containing eleven consecutive occurrences of the word 
'had'. 
Another difference arises with respect to intentional verbs. 
What is true or false, namely that p, is also what can be believed, 
expected, hoped, feared, etc. Yet, someone who is ignorant of 
English can believe the same as I do, for example that Atlantis 
never existed, but cannot be credited with believing the sentence 
'Atlantis never existed'. Moreover, what A believes, namely that p, 
may also be what B expects, C fears and D hopes. And it definitely 
makes no sense to expect, fear or hope a sentence. This suggests 
that when we speak of believing a sentence, this is elliptical for 
believing what is said by it. 
It might be objected that this last argument militates equally 
against ascribing truth or falsity to what is said: one can no more 
expect, fear or hope what is said than one can expect, fear or hope 
a sentence. However, although it would be odd to say 'I fear what 
she said', it is not odd to say 'What she said, namely that p, is what 
I fear'. By contrast, to say 'The sentence "p" is what I fear' at best 
expresses a (peculiar) fear of an object (inscription) or event. What 
I fear (and what others believe, etc.) is that p. But 'that p' is not a 
sentence (it can only be transformed into one by adding 'is true'), 
nor does it designate a sentence; it reports what was said. 
However, there are other responses to these arguments. First, it 
8 The following points are derived from Alan White's Truth (London 
and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 7-18. But White does not distin- 
guish between the claims that the bearers of truth are token-, type- and 
eternal sentences. 
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might be objected that they hold of truths, but need not hold of the 
bearers of truth, which may therefore be sentences after all. But 
this response fails. The bearers of truth are what 'is true' applies 
to, and hence they are what is true. But what is true is a truth. If it 
is true that p, that p is a truth. Consequently, what holds of truths 
also holds of the bearers of truth. 
Next, the proponents of eternal sentences might insist that some 
truths simply are German or hard to pronounce, and so on. But if 
this insistence is to be more than a petitio principii, they need to 
explain what it means for a truth to be German, other than that 
the sentence which expresses it is German. Moreover, they would 
also have to insist that 'Snow is white' and 'Schnee ist weiB-' sim- 
ply do not express the same truth. To phrase it in their terms, they 
are committed to the view that while both of these sentences are 
truths, they are not the same truth, since one of them is English 
and the other German. But that conclusion blatantly violates the 
way we individuate truths. 
As Alan White has shown, reflection on our actual use of the 
terms 'true' and 'false' shows that we apply them not to the act of 
saying or writing something, nor to what is used to say or write it 
(roughly, a token of a type-sentence), but to what is said or written, 
e.g. that there are mountains or that uranium is radioactive, and 
also to what is made in saying it, e.g. an assertion or statement. In 
this respect, 'true' differs from a term like 'exaggerated'. Whereas 
the latter applies exclusively to sayings, the former applies also to 
naked that-clauses: it is true that there are mountains, but it is an 
exaggeration to say that all logicians are pendants. When we speak 
of words or sentences as true, this is elliptical for what is said when 
we use them. Indeed, even those who postulate other truth-bearers 
often acknowledge that we actually use 'true' in this way.9 
It might be objected that the metaphysical nature of truth can- 
not be determined by reference to how we use 'true' and its cog- 
nates. But it is hard to see how our concept of truth-the subject of 
the debate-could be completely independent of how we explain 
and use 'true' and its cognates. Could it turn out, for example, 
that, the ordinary use of non-philosophical philistines notwith- 
standing, truths are actually a species of Amazonian termites? On 
what grounds can we rule out that suggestion, or a serious propos- 
al like mentalism, if not by reference to what it makes sense to say 
about truths, e.g. that they cannot crawl but can be communicat- 
ed? Nor can my points be dismissed as concerning only the super- 
ficial or pragmatic aspects of our use of 'true'. If any feature of 
9 E.g. M. Platts, The Ways of Meaning (London: Routledge, 1979), pp. 
38-9. 
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that use has semantic significance, it is that we apply 'true' to that- 
clauses rather than quoted sentences, and the way in which we 
individuate truths. 
However, there is a more sophisticated version of this objection. 
One might hold that like epistemic concepts, 'it does not make 
sense to say' creates an intensional context, and is therefore no 
obstacle to a metaphysical thesis about identity. That it does not 
make sense to say things about truths which it does make sense to 
say about sentences does not show that truths are not identical with 
sentences. Although we apply different terms to a truth on the one 
hand, a sentence on the other, the thing to which we apply them 
might be one and the same. This position is particularly attractive 
if one sticks to tokens rather than types, since it would allow one to 
combine a conceptual pluralism with an ontological monism, the 
idea that the reality to which we apply our diverse idioms is physi- 
cal. Our alethic vocabulary picks out a part of physical reality 
(token-sentences), but does so in a non-physical manner, just as, 
according to Davidson's anomalous monism, our mental vocabu- 
lary picks out brain-states in an irreducibly mental manner. 
I shall argue that there is a kernel of truth in this response: 
truths are not part of a reality beyond the physical world. 
However, it is doubtful whether it rehabilitates sentences as truth- 
bearers. For one thing, it is far from obvious that what it makes 
sense to say does create an intensional context. 'It makes no sense 
to say that the central truth of the theory of relativity is 2 cm long' 
and 'That E = mc2 is the central truth of the theory of relativity' 
seem to entail 'It makes no sense to say that that E = mc2 is 2 cm 
long'. In any event, this defence concedes that, alleged ontological 
identities notwithstanding, our concept of a truth differs from our 
concept of a sentence (whether types, tokens, or eternal types) in 
what it applies to and in its criteria of identity. 
III. Unbearable Truth-Bearers: Platonism 
Many philosophers have reacted to the shortcomings of nominal- 
ism by adopting a Platonist account of truth. According to that 
position, truths are self-subsistent abstract entities which exist eter- 
nally in a separate ontological realm beyond space and time; more- 
over, although our sentences express to such entities, these entities 
need not be understood, believed or stated by human beings; if 
they are, this is a further fact which is extrinsic to their existence. 
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Given the ontological divide it postulates between the material 
and the abstract realm, Platonism has great, if not insurmountable, 
difficulties in explaining this fact. Moreover, Platonism can be 
accused of replacing a puzzle-what distinguishes a truth from a 
sentence-by a mystery-the idea of a super-natural world beyond 
space and time to which we have access by some kind of 'intellec- 
tual intuition'. It treats truths as objects which are just like moun- 
tains, only without any spatial, temporal or causal properties; simi- 
larly, our grasp of truths is treated as a kind of perception, which 
is just like ordinary perception, only not sensible. But these quali- 
fications, many have felt, lead us directly from the familiar to the 
irredeemably mysterious. 
It might be replied that both parts of this 'just like..., only...' 
move are justified. Just like mountains, truths are objects in that 
they are grammatical subjects to which we refer by noun-phrases. 
Just like mountains, truths are not created or destroyed by people 
thinking or saying things. Unlike mountains, truths cannot be 
located in space and time, or be part of causal chains. 
In some respects, this reply is correct. Platonism is right to 
insist on the non-physical yet objective nature of truth. However, 
Platonism does not simply note important logical features of that- 
clauses or 'true'. It tries to explain these features by conceiving of 
truths as self-subsistent entities of an ethereal kind. As a result, it 
misconstrues these logical features. Not all grammatical subjects 
are objects; not all noun-phrases are names of objects. This has 
long since been recognized in cases like 'everything' and 'nothing'. 
But it holds equally of, e.g., 'the North' or 'the past', which are 
noun-phrases without referring to objects in even the most 
catholic sense of that term. Furthermore, like truths, the past can- 
not be altered by what people do or say. Being objective does not 
entail being an object. Platonism puts a metaphorical ontological 
gloss on logical truisms, and thereby fails to do justice to the 
explananda. 
One of these truisms is that while it makes sense to apply spatial 
and temporal terms to sayings, it does not make sense to apply 
them to what we say-truths and falsehoods. The truth that 
Hastings was fought in 1066 is located neither on the battle-field, 
nor in 1066. Platonism seems to take this point on board, but its 
metaphors actually militate against it. For it follows that the ques- 
tion 'Where are truths and falsehoods located?' should be rejected 
as based on a misunderstanding. Instead, Platonism answers that 
question by imputing a non-spatial sense to 'where' and saying, for 
example, that they are located in a 'third realm' beyond space. 
Equally, Platonism seems to accept that temporal terms do not 
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apply to truths. Yet at the same time it regards them as 'eternal', 
which means that they exist from the beginning to the end of time. 
But concepts of duration are no more licit here than concepts of 
temporal location. For example, it is not the case that the state- 
ment 'Children worked in the mines in England in the eighteenth 
century' ceased to be true, although it ceased to be true of England 
that children worked in its mines.'° Truths and falsehoods are not 
eternal or everlasting, as the Platonist metaphor suggests, they are 
timeless or atemporal. It is not that statements are true at all times; 
rather, the idea of being true at a time makes no sense. 
By a similar token, Platonism is right to reject the idea that the 
truth that there are radioactive substances was brought into existence 
around 1900, when people started believing and stating it, or that it 
could be destroyed by people stopping to do so. However, that truths 
are not the sort of things which can begin or cease to exist does not 
mean that they are things which are immune to change because 
they abide in a world beyond the causal order. To express the 
mind-independence or objectivity of truth by stating, e.g., 
(3) Before 1900, there was a truth that there are radioactive 
substances 
is infelicitous, and so is even the more acceptable 
(3') It was a truth before 1900 that there are radioactive sub- 
stances. 
What can be said is 
(3*) It is a truth that there were radioactive substances before 
1900. 
And that in turn is logically equivalent to 
(3#) There were radioactive substances before 1900. 
In trying to defend the objectivity of truth against mentalism and 
nominalism, Platonism misconstrues it. That (3#) is true irrespec- 
tively of our thinking or saying so has nothing to do with the 
alleged eternal existence of an entity in the abstract realm, but 
everything with the fact that, with certain exceptions (e.g. the 
statement that someone is talking), our saying that p does not make 
it the case that p. The objectivity of truth boils down to the con- 
ceptual truism that 'p' and 'People believe/think/state/say that p' 
do not entail each other. 
By a similar token, that different people can think the same 
thought or hold the same belief does not mean that there is an 
'0 Cf. A White, Truth (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 24-7. 
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abstract object to which they severally stand in the relation of 
thinking, believing, saying. It just means that both A and B believe 
that snow is white; that is to say, what they both believe is 
expressed by the same that-clause. If we are to disagree, what I say 
or assert must be what you deny. But this does not commit one to 
the existence of entities beyond space and time, only to the con- 
ceptual truism that if I deny what you assert, and you assert that p, 
then I deny that p. 
However, one might jettison the metaphorical talk of ethereal 
and eternal objects beyond space and time, while insisting that 
truths are abstract objects rather than mental or material ones. 
The problem with this austere version of Platonism is that the 
analogy between concrete and abstract objects is 'strictly limited 
and purely logical': they all are topics of speech or subjects of 
predication.11 In the case of truths or propositions, the analogy is 
even thinner than in the much debated case of numbers. 
To be sure, propositional- or that-clauses can function gram- 
matically as an accusative. But they are intentional rather than 
object-accusatives; that is to say, they do not specify something 
which needs to exist for the statement to be true. In 'A believes B', 
'B' is an object-accusative; it must refer for the statement to be 
true. By contrast, in 'A believes that p', we do not need two rela- 
ta-one to believe and one to be believed. When A believes falsely 
that p, then it is not case that p; there is no actual fact to which 
'that p' refers. But that is no threat to A having the belief that p.12 
Next, it seems that we can refer to what is said, stated or 
believed by that-clauses, and predicate certain things of it, e.g. that 
it is implausible, wonderful, unexpected, etc. In some cases we 
11 Strawson, Logico-Linguistic Papers, p. 74. 
12 See A. White, 'What we Believe', in N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in the 
Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972); P.M.S. Hacker, 'Malcolm 
and Searle on Intentional States', Philosophical Investigations 15 (1992). 
This distinction cannot be dismissed by invoking examples from fic- 
tional discourse, since in these cases A and B must both exist in the fic- 
tional world for 'A believes B' to be true. 
In the spirit of the Tractatus, it might be replied, however, that even in 
the case of 'A believes that p', there must exist a possible fact. But this 
boils down to saying that 'p' is a meaningful declarative sentence which is 
either true or false, depending on how things are. It does not affirm the 
existence of an object which is isomorphic with an actual fact, only less 
tangible. The postulation of such an intermediary between A's belief and 
the world implies that what A believes is one thing-a fact-if it is true 
that p, but another-a possible fact-if it is false that p; but what A 
believes must be the same in both cases. See my A Wittgenstein 
Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 'intentionality'. 
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even have names for what is said (the Pythagorean theorem, 
Newton's second law, Tractatus 3.5), which are substitutable salva 
veritate for the corresponding propositional clauses, e.g. 'Newton's 
second law is true' and 'that F = ma is true'. 
But what is said is not like what is eaten (a cake). The word 
'what' introduces a propositional clause, not the name of a thing. 
We say (believe/judge) that such-and-such is the case. The that- 
clause does not have the function of introducing an object. 
Contrast 'Mary Robinson is wonderful' with 'That communism 
collapsed is wonderful'. In the former case, there is a thing or per- 
son which has the quality of being wonderful. In the latter cases, 
there is no such thing or person: what is wonderful is not an 
object, but that communism collapsed. It might be replied that 
what is wonderful here is a fact. But a fact is no more an object 
than a truth; indeed, the two concepts are intimately connected. 
Like truths, facts are expressed by that-clauses, and are not located 
in space and time. Like the truth that Hastings was fought in 1066, 
the fact is neither here nor there, neither now nor then. 
Nor can it be argued that propositional clauses must refer to 
objects of some kind, since some of them are co-referential with 
names. While we can substitute co-referential expressions salva 
significatione even in intensional contexts, we cannot do so in the 
case of that-clauses and names of propositions: 'that p is my 
belief' is well-formed, but 'the theorem/proposition is my belief' 
is not; I can have heard of Newton's second law, but not of that 
F = ma. 
It may seem, however, that propositional clauses can occur to 
the left and right of the identity-sign, which is often taken to be a 
hallmark of referring expressions. But a statement like 'Newton's 
second law is that F = ma' is less common and perspicuous than 
'Newton's second law is: F = ma'. In these latter cases, the clause 
to the right of 'is' does not refer to Newton's second law, it states 
or expresses it. This is part and parcel of the fact that in most con- 
texts, propositional clauses are eliminable without change of sense 
or truth-value: 'A believes that F = ma' - 'A believes F to equal 
ma'; 'A expects that B will come' - 'A expects B to come'; 'A sus- 
pects that there is foul play' - 'A suspects foul play'; 'The clever- 
est thing A ever said was that p' - 'A said that p, and A never said 
anything as clever as that p'. In these cases, the only things 
referred to are B, A, and what A said. Combined with the negative 
points, this suggests that while propositional clauses are noun- 
phrases, their function differs from that of other referring expres- 
sions. By the same token, what is true or false, what is said or 
believed is not an object, entity or thing; it does not exist or obtain 
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in either the material world, as nominalism has it, or the abstract 
realm postulated by Platonism. 
IV. What People Say and the Concept of Truth 
Both nominalism and Platonism are among the sturdiest of philos- 
ophical paradigms. The above arguments do purport not to refute 
them, but only to provide arguments for avoiding both alterna- 
tives. Where do they leave anthropocentrism? They rule out an 
obvious justification of 
(1') If there were no people, there would be no bearers of truth 
namely that without people there would be no bearers of truth and 
falsity since there would be no sentences, albeit not on grounds of 
excessive anti-realism. However, both Davidson and Wittgenstein 
intimate a different rationale for (1'), and one which is in line with 
our argument. 
Wittgenstein insists that what is true or false is what people say, 
which is neither the act of saying, nor the tokens of types which 
are used to say it. Davidson's position involves the idea that 'true' 
applies to sentences. But he also suggests that it applies to types of 
utterances and inscriptions, where a type is not just an acoustic or 
typographic class, but comprises all utterances and inscriptions 
with the same truth-conditions, and hence tokens of different 
types, e.g. 'Schnee ist weif3' and 'Snow is white' ('The Structure 
and Content of Truth', p. 209). On both counts, it seems, (1') 
would hold. Without people or speakers, nothing would be said, 
no utterances or inscriptions would be made; hence there could be 
nothing for the concepts of truth and falsity to apply to. 
At first sight, it may appear as if this argument rests on the idea 
that the concepts of truth or falsity apply exclusively to what peo- 
ple actually say or write. This would be fatal, since there are true 
thoughts which have never been expressed. However, both 
Davidson and Wittgenstein recognize this point, which is why 
they link truth to 'thinking', or 'thinking creatures'. This does not 
affect their case against realism. (1') is independent of any claim 
about the relationship between thought and language. Without 
people, there could be neither true statements nor true thoughts. 
Another problem remains. There are not just true thoughts 
which no one has ever expressed, but also truths which no one has 
ever entertained, even in silence. Once more, Davidson and 
Wittgenstein are alive to this possibility. Thus Davidson stresses 
that sentences in his sense are not confined to types of utterances 
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that have been realized, but comprises types which have not. 
Equally, Wittgenstein's dictum is easily modified to read: true or 
false is what people say or could say. 
The real problem for anthropocentrism is whether this conces- 
sion is compatible with (1'). Given that a bearer of truth is a truth, 
(1') implies 
(1*) If there were no people, there would be no truths. 
But if there are truths no one has ever believed, there seems no 
reason to reject 
(4) If there were no people, there would still be truths. 
In any event, (4) seems required on pain of idealism. To reject 
(2) If there were no people, there would be no mountains 
is to accept 
(4') If there were no people, there would still be mountains. 
This in turn implies 
(4*) If there were no people, it would still be true that there are 
mountains. 
(4*) in turn seems to imply 
(4#) If there were no people, it would still be a truth that there 
are mountains. 
which itself implies (4). 
Rorty has recently questioned the move from (4') to (4*). 'What is 
"be true" supposed to mean in a world in which there are no state- 
ments to be true nor minds to have true beliefs?"3 According to 
Rorty, the realist cannot reply to this question without dogmati- 
cally presupposing his account of truth, and hence the dispute 
between him and his opponent hinges on incommensurable meta- 
physical attitudes. But this conclusion is precipitate. Rorty's chal- 
lenge to the realist runs together the question of what 'is true' 
means in a world without people with the question of what it 
means of a world without people. 
There is a strong case for holding that the phrase 'is true' would 
not mean anything in a world in which there are no people to use 
it. This case is of a piece with the conceptualist view that words 
13 
'Just one more Species doing its Best', London Review of Books 
25.07.91, p. 3; see also his 'Representation, Social Practice, and Truth', 
Philosophical Studies xxx (1988). 
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have meaning (and hence express a concept) not by virtue of being 
associated with a self-subsistent abstract entity, but by virtue of 
being explained and employed. In a world without people, ex 
hypothesis, no one would be in a position to explain the expression 
'is true', or to use it in statements like (4*). It would follow that 'is 
true' would be meaningless in such circumstances. 
But this does not entail that we cannot meaningfully use 'is true' 
to make a statement such as (4*). We can specify what such a state- 
ment amounts to without begging the question in favour of realism. 
'It is true that there are mountains' means the same of a world with- 
out people as it does of a world with people, namely simply that 
there are mountains. This equivalence does not rely on any realist or 
Platonist assumptions. In particular it does not presuppose a corre- 
spondence theory of truth according to which truth is a relation 
between a thought or proposition and a mind or language-indepen- 
dent item, a fact. On the contrary, the equivalence is essential to the 
deflationary account of truth which Rorty himself favours. Such 
deflationary accounts deny that truth involves a metaphysical rela- 
tion between thought and reality, on the grounds that there is noth- 
ing more to the concept than equivalences like 'It is true that p if 
and only if p' or (as Rorty, being a nominalist, would put it) "'p" is 
true if and only if p'. So, if Rorty is right to hold a deflationary 
account of truth, his argument against realism fails. More impor- 
tantly, whether or not a deflationary account of truth is adequate, 
the equivalence itself is a truism, on a par with Aristotle's famous 
observation that to say of what is that it is, is true. 
Does that mean that (1') and (1*) are simply false, irrespective 
of the merits of Platonism? One might resist that conclusion by 
employing against the realist the very distinction I used against 
Rorty. Even if there were no people, it would still be true that 
there are mountains, radioactive substances, etc. But all that 
means is that there are truths of a world without people, but not 
that there are truths in a world without people. Unless one endors- 
es Platonism, one has to admit that in such a world there would 
indeed be nothing-no thing-to which one could apply 'true', 
because there would be no statements, assertions, theories, etc. To 
be sure, what is true and false is not just what is actually said, but 
what could be said. But while many things can be said of a world 
without people, there is nothing which can be said in such a world, 
because, ex hypothesis, there is no one to say it. 
There is a kernel of truth in this argument. Barring Platonism, 
truths are not abstract entities which exist in a world without peo- 
ple because they are unaffected by the disappearance of humans 
thinking or expressing them. Nevertheless, we can say what holds 
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true in a world without people no less than we can say what holds 
true of such a world. The crucial point is that what holds true in or 
of both the actual and the fictional world, e.g. that there are moun- 
tains, is not a kind of object. Propositional clauses do not name 
objects of any kind, material, mental, or abstract, actual or possi- 
ble. That there are mountains is not a thing in either the fictional 
or the actual world. Rather, it holds true of the actual world and 
would hold true of the fictional world. 
Anthropocentrism should challenge not (4') itself, as Rorty does, 
but the move to (4#), and thereby to (4). These statements are not 
so much false as misleading, in that they speak of the existence of 
truths or of there being such-and such a truth. This suggests that 
truths are objects which are either created and destroyed at a certain 
time, as some anthropocentrics suggests, or exist eternally, irrespec- 
tive of what people say and do, as realism has it. But truths are not 
things which can begin to exist, cease to exist, or last for ever. 
Both realism and anthropocentrism are confused in so far as they 
make their debate turn on the existence and longevity of certain 
entities. At the same time, both contain important kernels of truth. 
Platonism is right to point out the difference between a saying and 
what is said. Anthropocentrism is right in insisting that what is said 
is not an abstract entity which exists separately from the utterance 
or inscription. It is distinct from the utterance only in the sense in 
which, e.g., a pound is distinct from a pound note. The note does 
not name a pound, but to present the note is to present a pound. 
Equally, the utterance does not name an abstract entity (proposi- 
tion), but to make the utterance in the appropriate circumstances is 
to say something, is to utter a truth or falsehood. To speak of what 
is said by different token-sentences, or to insist that different 
token-sentences can say the same thing, is not to relate them to a 
single abstract entity. Instead, it is to group or classify actual or 
potential token-sentences in a certain way, namely according to 
what, given our linguistic rules, they say or can be used to say. 'We 
are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of lan- 
guage, not about some non-spatial non-phantasm. Only it is possi- 
ble to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of ways."4 
Although truths are not themselves linguistic acts or their prod- 
ucts, anthropocentrism is right to regard them not as self-subsis- 
tent objects, but as what Prior called logical constructions from 
linguistic phenomena, namely from the that-clauses by which we 
report and refer to what people say."s The criteria of identity for 
14 Philosophical Investigations, §108; a similar view seems implicit in 
Davidson, Inquiries, pp. 43-5. 
"5 Objects of Thought (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971), ch. 2. 
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truths make essential references to linguistic acts (sayings or utter- 
ances). There are truths no one has ever uttered or thought of. But 
what distinguishes two such truths is evident from the declarative 
sentences which express them. Although our criteria of identity for 
truths and falsehoods are not the same as our criteria of identity 
for sentences, we can only identify the former because we can 
identify the latter. Although there are different linguistic expres- 
sions for the most important truth discovered by Newton and the 
most important truth discovered by Einstein, what distinguishes 
these two truths is evident from their expressions-'F = ma' and 
'E = mc2'. 
This line of thought does not support (1') or (1*), the claim that 
truths would go out of existence in the absence of people, or 
impugn (4*), the claim that even in the absence of people it would 
be true that there are mountains, etc. Instead, it suggests that it 
makes sense to speak of unentertained or unexpressed truths only 
because there are truths which people do entertain and express. 
Nor is this simply due to the need to explain 'unentertained' and 
'unexpressed' by reference to their opposites. The deeper rationale 
is that without implicit reference to the idea of people saying 
things, we can explain neither what 'is true' applies to, nor what 
distinguishes different truths. 
Instead of discoveries about the existence of truths, this argument 
reveals something about the concept of truth. One cannot have the 
concept of truth without having the concept of a sentence, hence 
the concept of a language, and hence the concept of language- 
users.'6 This does not establish that there cannot be truths without 
people. One cannot have the biological concept of a fruit without 
having the concept of a seed, but that does not show that there can- 
not be fruits without seeds. However, if I am right, the analogy 
does not hold. It is misleading to claim either that there can or that 
there cannot be truths without people; for, unlike fruits, truths are 
not objects. But although my argument concerns the concept of 
truth, it does not boil down to the conceptualist claim that, like any 
other concept, that of truth owes its existence to the activities of 
people. It expresses a new rationale for denying that there is a con- 
cept of truth in the absence of people, one which does not apply to 
all concepts. The notion of what people say or can say is essential to 
the concept of truth but not to other concepts. Without reference to 
what people say or can say it cannot be explained what 'true' 
applies to, or what distinguishes one truth from another. 
16 The argument is the reverse of, but compatible with, Davidson's 
idea that one cannot have the concept of a language without the concept 
of truth. 
103 
Hans-Johann Glock 
Both claims presuppose that even truths which have never been 
stated or entertained must be capable of being stated, at least in 
principle. It must be logically possible to formulate such truths. A 
determined realist might reject this assumption. However, to hold 
that there are truths which are essentially inexpressible is not to 
reject anti-realism, it is to condone a severe form of mysticism. This 
mysticism is stronger than Platonism, since it is possible to hold 
that thoughts are self-subsistent entities, while insisting (with 
Frege) that they must be capable of being expressed. Finally, 'ordi- 
nary' mystics maintain only that people have ineffable experiences 
(notably of a religious kind), that is, experiences which forever defy 
any attempts to articulate or elucidate them. Our realist mystic, by 
contrast, cannot even invoke ineffable experiences, since mention of 
experiences brings in people. If realism can only be salvaged by this 
kind of mysticism, it is less down to earth than it likes to appear. 
Finally, the realist might argue that even if it is an essential prop- 
erty of truths to be effable, this does not make them anthropocen- 
tric. For it is also an essential property of stones to be kickable. But 
while kickability and assertability are anthropocentric properties, 
stones are not anthropocentric objects, and hence neither need be 
truths. However, the analogy breaks down at the crucial point. 
Being kickable is not a defining feature of stones: we can explain 
what stones are without any mention of it. By contrast, if I am 
right, we can explain neither what truths are, nor what their criteria 
of identity are, without reference to the linguistic expressions of 
truths. 
My conclusion is therefore that there are three qualifications to 
the realist thesis that the concept of truth is absolutely independent 
of people which do not imply discredited anti-realisms: the concept 
of truth would not exist without people capable of calling some 
things true and others false; it is only possibly to state what the 
bearers of truth and falsity are in terms which implicitly refer to 
what people say; and we identify truths and falsehoods by grouping 
or classifying actual or potential token-sentences according to what 
they say. Put loosely, sentences, although they are not the bearers 
of truth, are the vehicles of truth, and language is its medium.7 
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